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We have not finished chanting the litany of the ignorances of the 
unconscious; it knows nothing of castration  or Oedipus, just as it knows 
nothing of parents, gods, the law, lack. The Women's Liberation 
movements are correct in saying: We are not castrated,  so you get fucked. 
-Deleuze  and Guattari,  Anti-Oedipus, 1984, 61. 
(onsider  the  central problem involved in examining eating disorders 
from an ethical or political perspective: On the one hand, as feminists, 
we want to recognize that the personal is political and that eating disor- 
ders cannot be explained at the level of individual pathology. An adequate 
account needs to address  the social or ideological domain of representation 
that in some way helps produce such disorders. This recognition has led 
to the critique of a representational  domain variously described as phallo- 
centric, phallogocentric, or patriarchal.  On the other hand, there is a reluc- 
tance to locate women as passive victims in some point of innocence out- 
side representation. Thus, the task for feminists has been conceived of as 
constructing autonomous women's representations, and this task has ap- 
pealed to an articulation  of the female body. The body is, then, considered 
as that which has been belied, distorted, and imagined by a masculine rep- 
resentational logic. At the same time, the body has been targeted as the 
redemptive opening  for a specifically feminine site of representation. In 
terms of  eating disorders, this ambivalence surrounding representation 
might be cashed out as follows: the anorexic is the victim of representation, 
trapped in embodiment through stereotypical and alienating images -  but 
at the same time only representation can cure this malaise; only a realistic, 
nonrepressive and less regulative form of representation  will allow women 
to  see themselves as autonomous  subjects. We argue that this tension 
surrounding  representation actually sustains the  Cartesian mind/body 
dualism that it  ostensibly  criticizes. In  what  follows,  we  draw on  the 
work of  Gilles Deleuze,  a philosopher who  has challenged the  notion 
that reason or thought  is the negation, repression, or ordering of some 
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prerepresentational  matter or presence.' Deleuze's work offers feminism 
the possibility of  a positive, active, and affirmative  ethics. For Deleuze, 
ethics is not the imposition of norms, nor the negation of law; ethics is the 
way in which bodies become, intersect, and affirm their existence. It is 
perhaps this more enabling or positive approach  to thought that has made 
Deleuze so appealing for recent feminist theory. 
In the case of eating disorders, Deleuze provides a way of thinking be- 
yond this representational  antinomy.  If the body is not a prediscursive  mat- 
ter that is then organized by representation,  one might see the body as the 
event of expression. This would  mean that ethics could not appeal to  a 
"normal"  body that might be authentically represented. Rather, the body 
would be understood in terms of what Deleuze calls its becomings, con- 
nections, events, and activities. In the case of an anorexic body, one would 
need to ask about a whole series of events and connections that surround 
that body--including  the  specific diagnostic and moral discourses and 
practices of eating disorders. Thus, Deleuze provides a way of thinking 
beyond the highly Cartesian  problem of the relation between a body and 
some imposed order of representation;  and Deleuze also provides feminist 
ethics with a position that need not be located at some limit point beyond 
patriarchal  or phallocentric thought. 
A new emphasis on  positivity in feminist theory has been evidenced 
most clearly in the "turn"  to Deleuze and Felix Guattari's  antipsychoana- 
lytic account of bodily becoming. This article pursues the possibility of an 
active feminist ethics by following through the problems encountered by 
the now overwhelming corpus of feminist body theory, or corporeal femi- 
nism. The issue of the body, inspired by Luce Irigaray's  (1985)  critique of 
Western metaphysics, has been explored by feminists such as Elizabeth 
Grosz, Moira Gatens, Judith Butler, and Rosi Braidotti to argue for the 
ways in which  bodies  are formed as imaginary bodies.2 Rather than a 
simple Cartesian  mind/body split, these feminists contend that the body is 
a crucial site of gender constitution. Reacting against a history that had 
devalued the body as feminine, these feminists argue that sexual difference 
has been produced through the negation of the body. They therefore at- 
tempt to rethink  the body as other than the negation of thought. Tradition- 
ally, the body had represented that which was excluded, disavowed, or 
In the conclusion to this article we look both at Deleuze's own work (Difference  and 
Repetition  [1994],  Negotiations  [1995])  as well as the coauthored works with Felix Guattari 
(Anti-Oedipus [1984],  What Is Philosophy?  [1994]).  In so doing,  we  set aside the difficult 
question of the distinction between Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. 
2 Grosz 1987,  1990,  1993,  1994a,  1994b,  1995; Gatens 1988,  1996;  Braidotti 1989a, 
1989b,  1991,  1994; Butler 1993,  1995. S  I G  N  S  Autumn  1998  I  37 
devalued by a masculine logic. Only an articulation  of the body, they argue, 
would provide feminism with an autonomous liberation from a primarily 
repressive  and negative masculine reason. Irigaray's  critique of philosophy's 
phallic economy was crucial in offering feminist thought  the project of 
sexual difference: here, the feminine might articulate  itself and not be sub- 
jected to a masculine representational economy. Subsequent attempts to 
rethink  the body have done so in the face of a reason that is diagnosed as 
repressive  of both the body and the feminine. Thus Grosz (1994b)  argues 
that Western thought in general exhibits a profound somatophobia, while 
the readings of Spinoza by Gatens (1988)  and Genevieve Lloyd (1989) 
attempt to react against a Cartesian  tradition by thinking mind as an "idea 
of the body."  But these highly sophisticated interventions directed against 
Western philosophy bear a striking similarity to the antirepresentational- 
ism in some feminist readings of popular culture in which the domain of 
representation  -  from pornography,  fashion, and beauty to the mass media 
in general  -  is deemed to be primarily  repressive  and negating. 
The idea that representation  intervenes to objectify, alienate, and dehu- 
manize the body has been most clearly articulated in accounts of eating 
disorders. Here,  as in the accounts of Western phallocentrism, women's 
bodies are positioned as prerepresentational,  silent, negated, and violently 
objectified by  an  active male  reason.  It  is  this  assumption of  an  all- 
pervasive,  repressive,  and dichotomous phallic logic that precludes  feminist 
ethics from becoming a form of active critique. In opposition  to the as- 
sumption of this binary--an  assumption that would leave feminism with 
the task of retrieving  the prerepresentational  female body-  in this article 
we argue for a positive feminist ethics. This ethics does not appeal to a 
repressed, silent,  innocent,  or negated feminine  but  approaches sexual 
difference as a site of practices,  comportments, and contested articulations. 
Here, feminism is not the other of thought, and this is so precisely because 
thought does not  have an overarching identity, logic,  or character (and 
therefore no privileged outside in general). 
Our argument turns around four main points: the current appeal to the 
body in opposition to a phallic logic is still cripplingly Cartesian;  to locate 
the feminine (body) as some limit point beyond representation precludes 
an examination of the specific, practical,  and historical techniques that reg- 
ulate bodies; there is no mind/body relation in general that need charac- 
terize Western thought,  but there is a series of practices and regimes in 
which bodies become; and, finally, an ethics that examines thought, dis- 
course, and reason as themselves bodily events allows an understanding of 
eating disorders in terms of bodily activity rather than in terms of a re- 
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Is thought  phallocentric?  Overcoming  Cartesian  dualism 
In this section, we explore the assumptions that have provided the concep- 
tual base of the postpsychoanalytic discourse of what we discuss here as 
"corporeal  feminism"-- a discourse offering a radical  anti-Cartesian  revalu- 
ation of the material  conditions that undermine the articulation  of the co- 
gito, representation,  and the sexed body. We base our analysis  of the prob- 
lem of "writing the body" on the vast amount of feminist literature that 
has followed  from  Irigaray's  major work Speculum  of the Other Woman 
(1985).  The theorists discussed here, including Butler, Grosz, Braidotti, 
and Gatens, have all responded to Irigaray  differently.  Furthermore, their 
ways of thinking through the implications of Irigaray's  theory of sexually 
different bodies have also varied. While recognizing the significant stra- 
tegic achievements gained through the project of  embodied  sexual dif- 
ference, we  aim to  raise the possibility of  another problem. As long  as 
corporeality,  materiality,  and authentic sexual difference are understood as 
radically  anterior to thought,  or negated by representation, feminist cri- 
tique will only be a reaction against dualism. By questioning the idea that 
representation is a "break"  with the fullness of reality,  or that the body is, 
to use Butler's terminology, a "constitutive outside" (1993),  we suggest 
that feminism rethink its antirepresentationalism.  The body is not, we ar- 
gue, a necessary outside produced by the limiting violence of representa- 
tion. We therefore contest one of the widely held claims of current  feminist 
theory: the idea that identification, representation, or body image is a ne- 
gation, exclusion, or repression of a prior and full real and that the mater- 
nal feminine is the figure of this excluded "outside" (Braidotti 1991, 268; 
Butler 1993, 39; Brennan 1996, 98). But we also contest the concomitant 
claim in "popular"  feminism that images, stereotypes, and representations 
of women's bodies have imposed inauthentic forms of gender identity and 
thus robbed women of their autonomy (Koval 1986; Wolf 1990). 
One of the most contentious and widespread examples of the problem 
of representation has been the debate over eating disorders and body im- 
age. Our intervention in this debate, rather  than offering another explana- 
tion  of  the  relation between  representation and the pathological body, 
seeks to think the body beyond the problem of representation.  That is, the 
body is not a prior fullness, anteriority,  or plenitude that is subsequently 
identified and organized through restricting representations. Representa- 
tions are not negations imposed on otherwise fluid bodies. Body images 
are not stereotypes that produce human beings as complicit subjects. On 
the contrary,  images, representations, and significations (as well as bodies) 
are aspects of ongoing  practices  of negotiation, reformation, and encoun- 
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of  (patriarchal)  representation. From this argument it follows that there 
cannot be a single theory of the body's relation to signification, nor a subse- 
quent  schema for explaining specific body  comportments  (such as eat- 
ing disorders), for the idea of a theory of the body (or the pathological 
body) presupposes a body in general. The work of Deleuze and Guattari, 
we argue, offers the possibility of a nonreactive feminist ethics. Such an 
ethics would not be defined in opposition to the masculinism of represen- 
tation but would create another concept of what it means to think (and 
in so doing  might look to  the body). A positive ethics of the body, we 
argue, would see the body as more than the limit, negation, or other of 
representation. 
How  to redefine the parameters  of what counts as thought is the ex- 
pressed goal of many of the postpsychoanalytic theorists of corporeality 
who also understand  their task as the positive reinscription  of a gynocentric 
body image -  an image that would remain uncontaminated by the repres- 
sive impulses of a phallocentric representational  economy. Overcoming the 
phallic symbolic order is described in a number of ways. Grosz calls for 
"new forms of representational practice outside of the patriarchal  frame- 
works which have thus far ensured the impossibility of women's autono- 
mous self-representations"  (1994b,  188). For some feminists the appeal is 
made to the signifier of"woman" in order to think its limit (Cornell 1991). 
Robyn Ferrell  and Vicki Kirby,  in different ways, also suggest that the task 
for feminism is thinking the difference between the signifier "woman" and 
the lived experience of women  (Ferrell 1991,  181; Kirby 1991,  17). Ac- 
cording to Butler,  who argues against identifying this outside as exclusively 
feminine, "The task is to refigure this necessary 'outside' as a future hori- 
zon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually  in the process of 
being overcome" (1993,  53). Following Irigaray,  these forms of corporeal 
feminism argue that feminists must avow the unacknowledged debt to 
matter that the specular  phallocentric  representational  system has systemat- 
ically disavowed (Braidotti 1991). In these views, matter is that which ex- 
ceeds and yet nourishes the very possibility of conceptualization (Irigaray 
1985, 21). 
Postmodern culture, it is argued, is undergoing an ambivalent process 
of grief in which the deaths of Man, Reason, History, and the Subject are 
variously celebrated, mourned, or simply denied as premature and irre- 
sponsible lies. According to Braidotti, psychoanalysis is not only the dis- 
course of this crisis; it also provides a way of recreating  new forms of sub- 
jectivity and knowledge  (1991,  17, 20).  Despite the redemptive tone of 
Braidotti's  diagnosis of Cartesianism's  decline, in crowning psychoanalysis 
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in general. Following Jacques Lacan, Braidotti argues that the Cartesian 
cogito is paranoid and narcissistic  and, further, that representationalism  is 
driven by pathological impulses (24-25).  The repression of the cogito's 
debt to a maternal  body is seen as the hallmark  of a phallocentric economy 
of the Same in which the sexual specificities of the female body are trans- 
lated as absence. For Braidotti, to think is to disavow a debt to the creative 
difference of a maternal  body (31).3 Or, as Rosalyn Diprose puts it, "sexed 
bodies  are constituted  within  an economy  of  representation of  sexual 
difference which limits possibilities for women" (1994,  xi). 
Butler has also argued that the subject is an effect of "the primary  repres- 
sion of its dependency on the maternal"  (1995,  42). Indeed, postpsycho- 
analytic corporeal feminist theory in general has argued that the Cartesian 
cogito  constitutes a phallocentric, disembodied denial of the fecund and 
creative  differences  of female corporeality (Grosz 1994b, 7). Modern ratio- 
nality is diagnosed as a pathological and phallocentric rejection of the ma- 
teriality of embodied existence (Brennan 1993,  11). It is this notion  of, 
in Butler's terms, "primary  repression"  that this article in part sets out to 
challenge. 
Set against  this focus on thought as an effect of repression,  lack, or nega- 
tion is the idea of the positive difference of specific bodies. That is, bodies 
are not the posited effects of representation, not an "outside" to discourse 
that is assumed only after the event of discourse itself. The idea of positive 
difference suggests that identity is not  an effect of  the imposition  of  a 
differentiating structure or language, but that existence itself is a field of 
singularities: differing relations and effects. Gatens, in Imaginary Bodies 
(1996),  emphasizes the importance of Deleuze's reading of Spinoza in this 
regard.  Thought would no longer be seen as contingently contained within 
a body but would be the realization  of a specific body and its various capac- 
ities. Gatens sees the Deleuzean/Spinozist emphasis on thought as the real- 
ization of the body  as enabling the reformulation of society's predominantly 
masculine body image. For Gatens, however, and for many of the feminist 
theorists of  eating  disorders considered  below,  the  self  is  constituted 
through body image: an image that is irreducibly  gendered. Gatens's  focus 
on body image sets itself against the idea that gender is merely an effect of 
cultural  construction or representation (1988,  41). However, while stress- 
ing the value of positive difference, she still sees the sexual subject as an 
3 Braidotti's  work extends and radicalizes  Lacan's  theory of the unrepresentable,  or nou- 
menal, character  of the maternal body. Lacan explicitly refers to the mother as the thing in 
itself (Lacan 1992,  106). And, for Lacan, "Das Ding is that which I will call the beyond-of- 
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effect of doubling whereby the subject occurs as a relation to its image. 
Positive difference, in contrast, suggests that the body itself might have 
effects and modes of being not reducible  to its  status  as image. 
As part of a general critique of rationality or Western thought, recent 
feminist accounts of the history of philosophy have challenged traditional 
feminism's sex/gender distinction by arguing that the idea of the cultural 
"construction"  of gender fails to think the body as anything other than an 
effect of noncorporeal factors. And, it is argued, to see the body as con- 
structed by cultural norms of gender is to adopt an implicitly masculinist 
and Cartesian  idea of a general human subjectivity  for which embodiment 
is a secondary accompaniment (Gatens 1988,  23;  Lloyd 1989,  20).  Re- 
acting even more passionately against the  supposed idealism or "men- 
talism"  of gender as a cultural  norm, there have been arguments that sexual 
difference is ontological and constitutive of the subject (Braidotti 1989b, 
102)  and that the body should be thought in its sexual specificity (Grosz 
1994b,  19). Not  only, then, would the body be something more than an 
effect of discursive construction, but the determining character  and speci- 
ficity of corporeality would  be primarily sexual. Sexuality would  not  be 
one issue among others, precisely because sexual difference is fundamental 
to the production of subjectivity in general. The subject, as in the case of 
thought in general, would be a negation of material specificity.  Corporeal 
difference would be the irreducible  difference against which the generality 
of  representation would  occur. It is not  surprising, then, that so much 
feminist criticism has concerned itself with the point at which the body is 
"subjected to" a certain image of thought. Representation, as the subjec- 
tion of the body to a certain body image, becomes the domain of contesta- 
tion: feminist theory concerns itself with issues such as eating disorders 
precisely because these issues demonstrate the typical repression or nega- 
tion of the body according to a limited, reified, or dominant body image. 
Thinking sexual difference, it is argued, would be a question of thinking 
the body beyond its (typically) gendered representation. The body is pos- 
ited as representation's  necessarily transgressive "other."  Overcoming the 
image of gender would  be achieved by turning to  the specificity of the 
sexed body. According to Diprose, "Insofar as differance  evokes a material 
remainder  to the economy of representation  which confines woman to the 
position  of  man's deficient other, then  it  indicates that the  bodies  of 
women are open to other possibilities" (1994,  79). 
Against such strongly corporealist arguments (Irigaray,  Braidotti, Di- 
prose) there also have been attempts to overcome dualism from a more 
"discursive"  perspective. Butler demands a solicitation of  the discursive 
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to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or representa- 
tional status of language, which claims that signs follow  bodies as their 
necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary,  it is productive, 
constitutive, one might even argue  performative,  inasmuch as this signifying 
act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to any 
and all signification" (1993,  30). 
If the opposition between sex and gender retains an implicit mind/body 
dualism then this is because it has sustained a naively empiricist or biologi- 
cal notion of sex. Refining the sex/gender distinction, these discursive ac- 
counts argue that the body of nature or biology is also thoroughly located 
within discourse and that the appeal to  a prediscursive "sex" is enabled 
only by discourse. Accordingly, the attempt is made to "free"  gender from 
sex-  to see gender not as a cultural overlay of sex but as that which pro- 
duces "sex" as a discursive given (Butler 1993,  22).  Gender is not, then, 
the social construction of "sex"; "sex" is yet one more discursive effect. 
Taking their lead from Michel Foucault's  notion of power and discourse as 
productive, these accounts reject any prediscursive  "exteriority"  or "given" 
that is subsequently represented. In Teresa  de Lauretis's  words, "Gender is 
not something to be represented but is always already a representation" 
(1987,  24). 
At the same time, such "discursive"  accounts have also taken on board 
the feminist critique of the disembodied subject. Like the "strong"  Irigara- 
yan corporeal arguments, these accounts draw heavily on  Lacan. Here, 
though, the "originary"  maternal body is seen as an ex post facto effect of 
signification. The maternal body as the primary ground that is lost in the 
acquisition of language is always already  a fantasized  object. Its prelinguis- 
tic status is itself an effect of the signifier.  The most sophisticated attempt 
to rethink the body as material  while at the same time not accepting either 
sexual difference or the body as a brute "given" is articulated  by Butler in 
Bodies  That  Matter (1993).  She argues that although discourse cannot be 
said to exhaust materiality,  materiality  cannot be located as a simple exte- 
rior or pure outside to discourse. While Butler asserts the presence of a 
certain "exteriority,"  this materiality  or exteriority is only an effect of dis- 
course (53). And although discourse, or the signifier, is material, the very 
materiality  of the signifier is also produced only through signification. Ex- 
tending this argument to the question of the body, Butler argues that cor- 
poreality may not  be discursive--its  very bodiliness or meaning is pre- 
sented  as prediscursive--but  this status as prediscursive is an effect of 
discourse (30).  Butler's account exemplifies the problem of the body in 
feminist theory. Any positing of the body as a brute given would lead back 
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effect it is not clear how  one  could avoid seeing the subject as an ideal 
projection or sign. It is precisely this strict division between representation 
and materiality that, we  argue, not  only sustains a Cartesian dualism in 
feminist theory but also has brought debates over specific issues (such as 
eating disorders) to an impasse. In the concretization of this problem (in 
feminist debates over body image) there is both an appeal to some body 
that would be more than a representational  type and a sense that the body 
is inescapably representational.  However, if the body is considered not as 
an "outside" to representation, nor as the site or sign of an excluded femi- 
nine, then the practical  problems of feminist ethics will not be determined 
in advance under the rubric of the status of representation. Eating disor- 
ders, for example, might not possess a single relation to representation, 
nor could they be exhaustively  accounted for through some general theory 
of signification and its relation to the signified. Representation is one factor 
among others in ethical problems of the body; it neither determines nor 
saturates  the field. The body is a negotiation with images, but it is also a 
negotiation with pleasures, pains, other bodies, space, visibility, and medi- 
cal practice; no single event in this field can act as a general ground for 
determining the status of the body. 
The value of Butler's account lies in its refusal to  subsume the body 
entirely beneath discourse, signification, or meaning, at the same time as 
this recognized corporeal "exteriority"  is acknowledged as being a discur- 
sive effect. Butler's  intense discursive  critique, in its denial of any prediscur- 
sive matter, is clearly and explicitly indebted to Foucault. But by arguing 
that matter, while not purely prediscursive, is still other than discursive, 
Butler  sustains an  opposition  between  discourse  and  some  "outside" 
(1993,  35). This is precisely the question she directs to Foucault: "Does 
Foucault's effort to work the notions of discourse and materiality  through 
one another fail to account for not only what is excluded  from the econo- 
mies of discursive  intelligibility that he describes, but what has  to  be  excluded 
for those economies to function as self-sustaining  systems?"  (35). For But- 
ler, discourse cannot include the outside; exteriority  may be known or the- 
matized through discourse but is not itself discursive. It is this boundary 
between signification and the constitutive outside that has produced the 
feminine as a sexed and prerepresentational materiality: "the feminine 
exceeds its figuration ...  [and] this unthematizability  constitutes the femi- 
nine as the impossible yet necessary  foundation of what can be thematized 
and figured" (1993,  41). 
This opposition  between representation and exteriority is enabled by 
seeing  discourse as language and signification (or  representation) that 
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Foucault's  radicalization  of discourse has been forgotten and the antidualist 
"immanence"  of Foucault's  account gives way to a revived, although prob- 
lematized, opposition between discourse and materiality.  Why, we might 
ask, does Butler sustain the very opposition  (representation/matter) that 
Foucault's  work set out to challenge? It may be that the current theoriza- 
tion of sexual difference, as the difference from the original maternal  body, 
will inevitably lead to an oppositional logic. (The persistence of the notion 
of the body as a privileged anteriority  sustains an anxiety regarding repre- 
sentation that is explicitly articulated  in the problem of women's body im- 
age.) For Butler is not content to stay within the "immanence" of Fou- 
cault's critique--an  antirepresentationalist  critique that would refuse the 
possibility of any privileged exteriority,  such as the body, outside discourse. 
As Butler herself notes,  no  discursive formation is ever closed or self- 
sufficient; it  must  always effect  an  exteriority that  it  purportedly re- 
presents. However, the production of "sex" as discourse's exterior is, as 
Foucault makes clear in The  History  of Sexuality  (1981),  a specifically  mod- 
ern problem. This is not because corporeality,  for Foucault, is "textual"  or 
"linguistic";  rather, discourse is a complex and dynamic configuration of 
events that includes the material and corporeal. Any "exterior"  -whether 
it be the body, consciousness, or being -is  the effect of the particular  and 
specific folding of discursive formations. Deleuze's critique of a general or 
transcendental  exteriority  can, we argue, provide ways of thinking beyond 
both the essentialist/discursive  feminist debate and the antirepresentation- 
alism that characterizes  much contemporary feminism. The argument that 
signification is positive, and not the repetition of a repressed depth or ab- 
sence, expands the idea of discourse beyond representation  or signification. 
The idea of representation (already challenged by Martin Heidegger) 
has continually been targeted in the work of Deleuze, Foucault, and Jean- 
Francois Lyotard (1993).  Against the mind-oriented theories of represen- 
tation, these writers attempt to think signification as positive or effective  - 
as an active event rather than as the negation of some ground or the re- 
presentation of some presence. It is this positive critique of representation 
that we bring to bear on corporeal feminism and that is the primary  focus 
for the conclusion of this article. For even Butler's challenging discursive 
account of sex still posits a duality between signification and matter,  where 
matter is seen as radically  anterior. Representation would always remain, 
in some sense, a negation of matter  -  a break  with a prior materiality,  even 
where that materiality  is an effect of representation.  Instead of thinking the 
body and matter as already coterminous within a general discursive field, 
Butler's  reading posits the body, or matter, as an originary effect of discur- 
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still to posit that materiality,  and that materiality  so posited will retain that 
positing as its constitutive condition" (1993,  67-68). 
While matter or corporeality may only ever be produced as a discursive 
effect, Butler still wants to hold on to an outside to discourse  -  albeit one 
that can only be experienced discursively.  Butler rejects the "ontological" 
claim made by feminists like Braidotti  -the  idea that sexual difference is 
not discursive but produces certain discursive positions (Butler, 59). And 
Butler's  account would also be less committed to the constitutive and spe- 
cific corporeality that Gatens and Lloyd have suggested might produce 
ways of thinking. But while Butler wants to avoid appeals to a prediscur- 
sive sexual difference, she does want to claim that corporeality  or the mate- 
riality of the body may have an effect in the production of subjectivity: 
"That referent, that abiding function of the world, is to persist as the hori- 
zon  and the 'that which' which makes its demand in and to  language" 
(1993,  69). In this sense her work might be set alongside Grosz's Volatile 
Bodies  (1994b),  a book that sees the body and mind relation as a complex 
interweaving of both "outside" and "inside."  Like Butler, Grosz rejects  any 
"inside out" approach, where the body would be a projection of mind, at 
the same time as she problematizes an "outside in" approach, where the 
body as object would determine a way of thinking. While Butler sees the 
character  of the body as the consequence of performativity (in which its 
way of being is made meaningful), Grosz sees the body according to the 
metaphor of the Mobius strip  -  a dynamically interacting interior and ex- 
terior that turn into each other (209).  Grosz by no means wants to see 
the body as a discursive production; her "inside out" argument suggests 
that bodies are also constitutive of the ways in which experience is consti- 
tuted. However, what these quite different accounts share is the complica- 
tion  of dualism. For Butler, discourse and materiality cannot simply be 
opposed but are  mutually constitutive. For Grosz, corporeality  is explained 
through an amalgam of  "outside in" and "inside out" approaches such 
that the mind and body are inseparable.4  But, we would argue, as long as 
representation is seen as a negation of corporeality,  dualism can only ever 
be complicated and never overcome. 
4 Grosz's recent work on Deleuze and space opens the possibility for a move beyond the 
problem of the "interior"  subject and its constitution in relation to an exteriority. In Space, 
Time  and Perversion  (1995),  Grosz argues that Deleuze's work suggests that a retracing  of the 
interior/exterior boundary will demonstrate the fluidity, malleability, and dynamism of the 
boundary (131).  If such boundaries are open to reconfiguration it follows that representa- 
tion's "other"  will be continually refigured, reformed, and renegotiated. It is this direction in 
Deleuze's work, signaled by Grosz, that our conclusion explores in order to challenge the 
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In arguing for the corporeal character  of subjectivity, Butler turns to 
psychoanalysis, in particular,  to Lacan's  notion of the Imaginary.  It is here 
that Butler's  primarily  discursive account (which adopts a rhetoric of"cita- 
tionality,"  "signification,"  "performatives,"  and "discourse") gains its cor- 
poreal edge. And it is here, also, that Butler's work intersects with other 
accounts of the body-those  of Grosz, Braidotti, Jane Gallop, and (to a 
lesser extent) Gatens and Lloyd. Significantly,  what the Lacanian  theory of 
the Imaginary enables is a notion of subjectivity that sees the self or ego 
as an introjection of the visualized or represented body. The question of 
representation, then, becomes fundamental to the production of the em- 
bodied subject. 
Feminist theory and the critique of phallogocentrism 
"The most far reaching critique Freud advances of philosophy," suggests 
Braidotti, "is that it establishes  a de facto and de jure identification between 
human subjectivity and rational consciousness" (1991,  18). While Brai- 
dotti is specifically  referring to Freud's diagnosis of philosophy as a neu- 
rotic structure in "The Future of an Illusion" (1985),  her more general 
point  is that Lacanian psychoanalysis must be acknowledged as a criti- 
cal revolutionary moment in the history of Western metaphysics, as a spe- 
cific challenge to a Cartesian disavowal of the cognizance of the material 
body and thus the idea of a rational mind. Indeed, for Braidotti and some 
other feminists (Diprose, Gatens, Grosz)5 the vital necessity of thinking- 
through-the-body and of establishing the corporeal  grounds of intelligence 
is perhaps the most important epistemological concern of contemporary 
Western feminist philosophy. 
Moreover, this concern is argued to be an urgent task (one of life and 
death), for representational disavowals of the female body are argued to 
have calculable effects. The  "anorexic" practice of  self-starvation is fre- 
quently diagnosed as a corporeal response to  the incorporation of,  and 
living out  of,  phallocentric representations (Grosz 1994b,  40).  Women 
are, it is argued, at risk: phallocentric representations  contaminate women 
with potentially fatal body images. The very exemplarity  of the female an- 
orexic body (set alongside its psychoanalytic  diagnosis) reinforces  the per- 
ception of corporeality as the passive "other" of a violent yet necessary 
5 Braidotti's  Nomadic  Subjects  (1994),  Grosz's Space,  Time  and Perversion  (1995)  and Ga- 
tens's Imaginary  Bodies  (1996)  have also provided valuable criticisms of the Lacanian  theory 
of the maternal outside and the primacy of body image. Our own work and critique follow 
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representational  negation. By accepting the Lacanian  theory of the subject 
as an effect of representational closure, many theories of the body posit 
corporeality as an impossible exteriority (Butler 1993,  90; Diprose 1994, 
80).  Further, only  a psychoanalytic interpretation of  the  repressed, re- 
jected, or negated effects of the body, it is often argued, will cure us of our 
Cartesian  maladies (Brennan 1996). 
Indeed  the  apocalyptic  tone  of  corporeal  feminism  is  frequently 
matched with the invocation of the liberating potential of psychoanalysis. 
Braidotti, for example, writes that "decoding the psychopathology of this 
end of the century may well be one of the most urgent tasks for the critical 
intellectual in general and the feminist one  in particular"  (1989b,  147). 
Similarly,  Somer Brodribb diagnoses postmodernism as a "neurotic symp- 
tom," a form of "paranoid masculine somatophobia" (1992,  15),  while 
Zoe  Sofia argues that "rationality is a masculine thing" (1993,  15-17), 
reason a "fantasy of  control" (27),  and technology  a sadistic epistemo- 
philic plundering of the mother's body (94). Susan Bordo argues that an- 
orexia is a symptom of a pathological Cartesian separation between mind 
and body (1992),  while Gallop talks of the "systematic mind-body split 
that is killing our children" (1992,  24).  These concrete accounts of  an- 
orexia and women's embodiment rely on a decade or more of corporeal 
feminism  in  which  the  body  is  seen  as philosophy's repressed (Grosz 
1994b,  5), discourse's outside (Butler 1993),  an effect of maternal nega- 
tion  (Irigaray 1985),  or  the  Cartesian subject's unacknowledged  debt 
(Braidotti 1991). 
It is worth calling attention to a central binary operating within corpo- 
real feminism that in turn collects a host of related ethico-political judg- 
ments into its fold. The concepts of"disembodiment" and "embodiment" 
function dichotomously such that "disembodiment" is frequently coded as 
a phallocentric fantasy articulated  through a dualist and specular  represen- 
tational economy  that finds its most perfect expression in the Cartesian 
cogito. According to Grosz, "Dualism, in short, is responsible for the mod- 
ern forms of elevation of consciousness positioned outside of the world, 
outside its body, outside of nature" (1994b,  7). Whereas Grosz's work, 
like Braidotti's, regards feminism as the overcoming of such dichotomies, 
Butler's  notion of a constitutive outside regards  the otherness of matter or 
sex as a radical opening. In either case, however, the distinction between 
phallic/symbolic representation and the  maternal/corporeal other is  as- 
sumed as a diagnosis of women's condition. Mapped onto the embodied/ 
disembodied binary are a series of other oppositions, most notably the pre- 
Oedipal/Oedipal, precastrated/castrated,  premodern/modern binaries that 
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strongly aligned with alienation: phallocentric representations set up an 
alienating distance between the body and mind (Grosz 1994b,  188). The 
masculinization of  rationality, argues Bordo,  has calculable and lethal 
effects on women and nature; the distance between representation  and the 
body must be closed to enable the transformative  and healing qualities of 
"empathetic connections" (1986).  Or, as Philipa Rothfield argues, femi- 
nists must "listen to  the body" in order to  cure mind/body  separation 
(1990,  140-41). 
However, the idea that representations  alienate the body is not new and 
may be traced to Jean-Jacques  Rousseau ([1761]  1984)  who, in Discourse 
oflnequality,  argues  that the history of reason and modernity is also concur- 
rently a history of  illness. Philosophy must return to  the natural moral 
purity of the body, argues Rousseau, in order to escape the illness of rea- 
son. Similarly,  post-Lacanian (and therefore neo-Romantic) forms of cor- 
poreal feminism tend to reject reason as a symptom of a pervasive alien- 
ation (Brennan 1993,  11),6 as though reason itself somehow prevents the 
existential authenticity of a poetic corporeal self-invention. 
The critique of Descartes's mind/body split has, then, become a chant 
of negativity: representations  are phallocentric and thus disembodied; rea- 
son is phallocentric;  language is phallocentric;  history is phallocentric;  phi- 
losophy is phallocentric; science and technology are phallocentric; all cul- 
tural productions are phallocentric; and even "touching is phallic in this 
culture" (Grosz 1994a,  10).7 Feminist theorists who neglect to recognize 
the fundamental phallocentrism of knowledge at all levels, argues Grosz, 
are participating "in the social devaluing of the body that goes hand in 
hand with the oppression of women" (10). As Meaghan Morris has noted, 
the reiteration of this fundamental thesis and its application results in a 
fixing of positions, a loss of rhetorical flexibility, and, ironically, a closing 
off of so-called feminine fluidity (1988,  101). This delimitation of a proper 
ethical space for a feminism that must be "corporeal"  depends on the exclu- 
sion of a question; and by refusing to engage with this question, we would 
argue, feminism risks losing  its democratizing potential. It is therefore 
6 Brennan adapts the Frankfurt  School's idea that reason is a progressive domination of 
nature by the ego to a theory regarding  the violent fantasy  of the excluded female body: "The 
subject is founded by a hallucinatory  fantasy in which it conceives itself as the locus of active 
agency and the environment as passive; its subjectivity is secured by a projection onto  the 
environment, apparently beginning with the mother, which makes her into an object which 
the subject in fantasy controls" (1993,  11). 
7 The pervasiveness  of the phallic order is evidenced by the many feminist invocations of 
the "outside" (Butler 1993), the "limit" (Cornell 1991), the "other"  (Irigaray  1985), or even 
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with an awareness that the articulation of this question might be under- 
stood as phallocentric that we now ask, Is representation phallocentric?  It 
is important to ask this question again and to keep asking it, because the 
reiteration  of its answer  -  yes, representations  are phallocentric  and disem- 
bodied-has  become a fundamental thesis that closes the opening up of 
further questions. 
One way of opening up this question is to ask what the implications 
and costs of such 'a thesis are. What is the status of women's body image 
when the entire domain of representations is argued to be phallocentric? 
What are the implications of arguing that women's body images are cas- 
trated? Or, we  might  ask another, simple, pedestrian, rather stubborn, 
slightly stupid question: If all representations  are phallocentric, if thought 
is disembodied, how do women read and think?  At what cost is the entire 
edifice of representation coded as phallocentric?  In asking these questions 
we must first address the various ways they have been answered within 
corporeal feminism. In questioning these answers we hope to open up a 
space in which further questions and further answers might be circulated. 
To address  this question it is necessary  to take a detour, to turn to an exem- 
plary instance of (dis)embodiment used throughout corporeal feminism, 
that of the anorexic.  We turn to this example because it occurs with surpris- 
ing regularity  in corporeal feminist arguments about body image and rep- 
resentation, matter and form. 
Exemplary  body/images:  Anorexia 
Anorexia  nervosa  is a powerful  example  where  the external  perspectives  of 
an ideal  body  weight  and  appearance  have  a distorting  effect  on women's 
phenomenal  experience.  The tyranny  of the thin body  as an objective 
ideal  mediates  women's  phenomenal  experience  of themselves  such  that 
theyfeel  fat. Considered  objectively,  their  bodies  are  skeletal,  but the self- 
representation  of an objective  ideal  works  to influence  their  bodily  feeling 
especially  around  eating  but also  their  various  perceptions  and  experiences 
of flesh. (Rothfield  1994, 39) 
The problem, as it is frequently articulated, is that representations of the 
body are phallocentric; and, therefore, women's body images are the prod- 
uct  of  a phallocentric Imaginary. Worse still, the  very morphology  of 
knowledge is seen to be a product of a specular  relation to the phallocentric 
Imaginary.  According to Grosz, "all cultural production is phallocentric" 
(1993,  195). Accordingly, feminist women must "produce new spaces as 
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rather  than simply reproducing them-selves according to men's representa- 
tion of women" (195,204).  It follows, then, that women need more gyno- 
centric representations  if women are to escape a (potentially lethal) phallo- 
centric body image. At stake is a radical  transformation  of the phallocentric 
morphology of knowledge itself and the establishment of a feminine aes- 
thetics that is capable  of adequately  and autonomously representing  female 
morphology. The dangers of the phallic Imaginary and the need for a rep- 
resentational revolution are no better exemplified than in the case of the 
anorexic. 
Grosz, for example, argues that anorexia is an attempt to actualize an 
idealized body image that is incorporated  by the subject from phallocentric 
representations  of thin femininity. Dismissing what she perceives  to be two 
popular etiological explanations of anorexia as an ego or dieting disorder, 
Grosz argues that "anorexia can, like the phantom limb,  be  a kind of 
mourning for a pre-Oedipal (i.e., precastrated)  body and a corporeal con- 
nection to the mother that women in patriarchy  are required to abandon" 
(1994b,  40).  Grosz continues by arguing that anorexia should be inter- 
preted as a renunciation of patriarchal  ideals of femininity and not as an 
excessively compliant performance of them. There are several moves oc- 
curring here. To begin with, the idea that women's body images are deter- 
mined by a precastrated/castrated  matrix and that women  in general are 
coerced into relinquishing a sympathetic connection to a maternal body 
image reiterates a largely unchallenged Freudianism.8  Second, the use of 
the pathology of anorexia  as a synecdoche for female consciousness in gen- 
eral propagates a notion of an ahistorical  psyche; this psychic theory pre- 
sumably accounts  not  only  for  all anorexics but  also  for  all women 
subjected to  patriarchy.  Finally, to  argue that women  who  practice self- 
starvation are either compliant with, or revolting against, patriarchal  body 
images is to posit a causal and unproblematic connection between cultural 
images and corporeality,  representation and the body. 
For the moment  we wish to  focus on this last point for, as we  shall 
argue, it informs a popular interpretive trend within corporeal feminism. 
The understanding that (phallocentric) representations  of women's bodies 
direct the formation of women's body images is a common but rarely  con- 
tested assumption within both corporeal feminism and popular culture. 
The domain of representation  -mass  culture, the history of literature,  sci- 
ence,  and so on-is  seen to  be caused or produced by an unconscious 
8 The notion of the maternal as a representational  outside depends on an assumption of 
the Oedipal genesis of the subject. It is this Freudianism that, in various ways, sustains the 
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Cartesianism. (Both Braidotti's  Patterns  of Dissonance  [1991]  and Grosz's 
Volatile  Bodies  [1994b]  argue for the singular importance of the Cartesian 
separation.) And these representations in turn cause women's self-image. 
Images are  judged as being pernicious insofar as they are effects of a phallic 
metaphysics and the cause of women's oppression. Butler refers  to a "hege- 
monic" imaginary (1993,  91),  while Grosz argues that "women's body 
images are clearly  different from men's and are modelled on lack and castra- 
tion" (1994b,  73). 
Many of the arguments surrounding the issue of body image in popular 
feminism directly or indirectly locate media representations of thin femi- 
ninity as the etiology  of anorexia and bulimia. Theorists such as Susan 
Bordo argue that representations of thin femininity reiterate a symptom- 
atic Cartesian  rejection of female embodiment. Bordo also argues that "the 
anorexic's  distorted image of her body--her  inability to see it as anything 
but 'too  fat'-while  more extreme, is not  radically discontinuous from 
fairly  common female misconceptions" (1992,  40). In other words, Bordo 
is suggesting that a distorted body image is something that is common to 
most women.  Bordo (and, before her, Hilde Bruch, Susie Orbach, Kim 
Chernin, and Marilyn Lawrence)9 maintains that representations of thin 
femininity induce anorexia in their female consumers. Typically,  television 
and fashion advertisements  are held responsible for the increase  in anorexia 
in the past two decades. Indeed the popularity of Naomi Wolf's The  Beauty 
Myth (1990)  has transformed this interpretation into a form of common 
sense that is frequently expressed  within the pages of most women's maga- 
zines. Such understandings have led Maud Ellmann to comment that an- 
orexia appears to be constructed as "the disease of the McLuhan age, dis- 
seminated by telecommunications rather than by contact" (1993,  24). In 
her analysis of the causal relationship posited between mass media images 
and anorexia, Elspeth Probyn has offered the following  useful insight: 
"What  we can clearly  hear from these descriptions is that women are patho- 
logically susceptible to  media images" (1987,  203).  Why is it, she asks, 
that only women are argued to suffer from living in a late twentieth-cen- 
tury media-scape?  Or, to put it another way, why is it that only women are 
argued to  suffer from representations? It is possible to  extend Probyn's 
point and argue that what we are witnessing--in  the assumption that all 
women's body images are castrated  because they incorporate phallocentric 
representations  -  is the pathologization of women's reading practices.  And 
such a pathologization, we will argue, is only possible if the body is already 
posited according to a semiotic gnoseology whereby the body is seen as a 
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sign of some interiority or meaning. Furthermore,  the acceptance  that the 
body is a body image is articulated  within an insistently dichotomous rhet- 
oric. The  repressive/general/representational/gendered  (phallic) body  as 
image is set against the negated/specific/material/sexed  (maternal) body as 
lived corporeality. 
Indeed, what is at stake in theories of women's body image is a descrip- 
tion of the way women judge or apprehend phallocentric representations 
of the female body. Women's body images, and their subjectivity in gen- 
eral, are seen to be formed through a representational  system that is mono- 
lithically phallocentric. Consequently,  Butler suggests  that  the  radical 
transformation of discourse and materiality be achieved through the per- 
formance of a "lesbian  phallus" (1993,  86). Drucilla Cornell argues that it 
is only the "beyond"  of signification that can overcome the phallic determi- 
nation of"Woman" (1991). Further,  the passive incorporation of represen- 
tations is, more often than not, figured in terms of introjection, incorpora- 
tion  (Rose  1986),  and  a  series  of  related gustatory  and  alimentary 
metaphors (Orbach 1986).  What seems to be an underlying assumption 
in accounts of anorexia and the female body in general is the idea that the 
internalization  of a body image rests on a particular  mode of consumption. 
A critical  approach  to ethical problems of the body might question the idea 
of the body as an effect of image consumption and would do so by looking 
to the body's various effects and forces, rather than its capacities to be a 
sign, theater,  or image. For as long as the mind/body problem is negotiated 
via metaphors of consumption, ingestion, and incorporation, feminist the- 
ory will be constrained by a particular  bodily practice being accepted in 
advance as an explanation for the body in general.'0 
The account of women's general condition is thereby conflated with the 
introjection models that explain anorexia. Orbach's  account of anorexia in 
The Hunger Strike (1986)  relies on the British school of object relations 
and in doing so extends Winnicott's theory of the "false  self" into a theory 
of the "false  body."  Like the false self, the false body is fashioned as a narcis- 
sistic defense against a threatening exteriority;  thus women develop a false 
body image because they internalize  a "bad  object" that Orbach specifically 
identifies as an objectified representation  of the female body. The develop- 
ment of a corporeal sense of self thus depends on an act of consumption 
10  Here, again, we would like to signal an important suggestion made by Grosz. Despite 
its dependence on the notion of body image, Volatile  Bodies  argues that "the body must be 
seen as a series of processes of becoming, rather  than as a fixed state of being" (1994b,  12). 
While we are critical of the suggestion that the body's process is set in opposition  to  the 
fixity of body representation, the direction of our own work extends Grosz's insight into the 
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or internalization. For Orbach, the false body does not provide the subject 
with  a stable identity  but  rather a "malleable,"  "fluid," "manipulable," 
"physical  plasticity."  In many ways this definition of the "false  body" corre- 
sponds to recent feminist uses of the Lacanian  Imaginary (such as Grosz's 
Volatile  Bodies (1994b)  or  Teresa Brennan's "Essence against Identity" 
(1996),  both of which focus on the central importance of body image and 
identification). Both the idea of the "false  body" and the phallic Imaginary 
suggest that women  may have a particular  propensity for developing an 
inauthentic body image because external phallocentric representations of 
the female body are internalized to produce inauthentic representations  of 
women's bodies. 
However, this understanding of body image relies on the idea that the 
subject mindlessly incorporates representations.  Janice  Radway has argued 
against the use of derogatory alimentary  metaphors to explain the complex 
act of  reading in "Reading Is Not  Eating" (1986).  Radway's critique is 
opposed to the standard  psychoanalytic  theories of reading such as that of 
James Strachey who,  in "Some Unconscious Factors in Reading," argues 
that a "coprophagic tendency lies at the root of all reading" (1930,  329). 
Strachey's psychoanalytic interpretation (while ostensibly  anti-Cartesian 
insofar as it foregrounds the subject's embodied response to  representa- 
tions) nevertheless reduces critical  thinking to a mere repression and subli- 
mation of the imagined nightmares of an infant's corporeal desires. The 
reduction of the critical abilities of adults to that of infants assumes that 
consciousness is merely the expression of an elementary (and alimentary) 
sensuality. Furthermore, not only does the frequent use of the female an- 
orexic as the paradigm case of representational consumption feminize a 
reading/viewing practice  figured as pathologically passive, but the implicit 
denigration of this passive consumption sustains a Cartesian  anxiety about 
the corruption of mind by an alien matter. Simultaneously, feminism has 
endorsed a sense of the inadequacy of sensuous apprehension (in its cri- 
tique of representation) at the same time as it sees a disembodied thought 
or reason as perniciously masculine. It may well be that the supposed apoc- 
alyptic break  between a rational  Cartesianism  and a postmodern materialist 
feminism remains caught within a theory of consciousness as a negation of 
the material and representation as a negation of the body. 
Consequently,  the  ludic  valorization  of  thinking-through-the-body, 
while  ostensibly  a  challenge  to  what  is  perceived to  be  a  pervasive 
all-encompassing Cartesian  mind/body duality, runs the risk of advocating 
a reductive sensuous "embodied" relation to representations.  This sensual- 
ist  theory  of  representation (where women's  images would  no  longer 
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interior/exterior model  of  Cartesian dualism that it sought  to  criticize. 
There is also a further irony in that an embodied or sensuous consumption 
of images or representations is diagnosed as the evil etiology of anorexia, 
bulimia, and hysteria. These "examples"  are then extrapolated into a gen- 
eral  theory about the formation of women's body images through the con- 
sumption of phallocentric representations.  A more authentically  "embod- 
ied" (feminine)  relation to  thought  is called for at the same time that 
certain reading practices are seen  as pathologically sensualist. In  other 
words, it appears that corporeal feminism is caught within a tautologous 
relation to  Cartesianism and consciousness. While "embodiment" is fig- 
ured as the overcoming of a pernicious dualism, the "disease"  of disembod- 
ied representation is figured in a highly Cartesian  topography of the sub- 
ject. What needs to be challenged, we would  argue, are the premises of 
constitutive negation that inform the critique of Cartesian  subjectivity  and 
lead to the contradictory celebration of a putatively sensualist or material 
preconscious. 
Lack  and negation:  Beyond neo-Romantic alienation 
The argument that meaning, representation,  and subjectivity  are organized 
around lack begins from the assumption that there is an originary mater- 
nal/pre-Oedipal/preconscious plenitude that is negated in the movement 
of  difference that produces the  subject. Identity is,  then,  the  effect of 
difference; but this difference is also the negation of an originary identity. 
Lacanian  psychoanalysis  theorizes symbolic recognition as an awareness  of 
the self's radical  alienation and lack. For Lacan the subject remains essen- 
tially alienated; and this alienation is the effect of the negation of plenitude 
and presence (even if this plenitude is an effect of an ex post facto positing). 
Feminist theory has inserted itself in this argument by frequently ac- 
cepting the metaphor of castration  for this originary negation of presence. 
(Butler's  focus on the "lesbian  phallus,"  for example, begins with a critical 
acceptance of the castration matrix.) Furthermore, the prelinguistic pleni- 
tude is also accepted as being maternal. While the metaphorical status of 
this Oedipal triangle of maternal presence, symbolic castration, and the 
phallus is generally asserted, what are not questioned are (a) originary (if 
idealized) maternal plenitude, (b) subjectivity as the difference from this 
more originary identity, and (c) bodily identity as produced through this 
process of negation and identification. Further, as we have demonstrated 
in the previous section, even when explicitly Lacanian arguments are not 
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limiting character  of representation set against a putatively more authen- 
tic corporeality. 
A Deleuzean way of thinking through the body would  challenge the 
privilege of  the  Oedipal metaphor and would,  furthermore, attack the 
premises of originary identity, lack, and negation on which the Oedipal 
metaphor is based. If, as feminist theory has so convincingly argued, West- 
ern thought has been marked by a series of dualisms that consistently de- 
value the feminine, why has the "corporealist"  challenge to dualism sus- 
tained the dichotomies of identity and difference, presence and lack, being 
and representation,  subject and other? While the uptake of Lacan  has prob- 
lematized many of these binaries, the idea that the body is primarily the 
effect of "body image,"  "the Imaginary,"  representation,  or introjection sus- 
tains a dualist and possibly psychologistic approach.  To see the body as the 
introjection or internalization  of an external  image is to give a highly mind- 
dependent account of the body. Such an account would remain within a 
history of consciousness, where mind is conceived as a stage, theater, or 
screen set over against the full presence of the world. As long as specific 
problems of corporeality, such as eating disorders, are interpreted as dis- 
eases of representation, feminist criticism will only be able to offer a reac- 
tive response to its perceived malaise. Refiguring the problem of the body 
demands that it be seen as more than a semiotic symptom. 
Toward an ethical grammar of the body 
Deleuze's task, articulated clearly in Difference  and Repetition  (1994),  has 
been to challenge both the dominance of the traditional definition of the 
"concept" and the primacy of representation. If we try to think being, or 
what is, on the basis of how it can be thought or presented to an ego, then 
concepts of representation  will be primary  (68). But what representational- 
ism also sustains is the idea of  a unified image of thought:  as a site of 
representation the subject is perceived in terms of its relation, negation, 
recognition, or encounter with an outside world. Thought in general is 
typified by its capacity to re-present an exteriority from which it is differ- 
entiated. Difference here is always thought as differenceffrom  and is defined 
in relation to thought's capacity to identify in terms of the concept. The 
concept  will  be the  locus  of  meaning  and identity that both  "misses" 
the real difference of the singular thing and is produced through a process 
of  mental  differentiation  (220).  Deleuze's  challenge  to  the  primacy 
of meaning or the concept as a condition for being, in contrast, is radi- 
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philosophy, are not limitations or formalizations  of experience; rather,  they 
are themselves creations, events, and responses. The body is not a concep- 
tualized body image, nor is it a meaning to be interpreted. While concepts 
are events, responses, and creations, bodies are a different mode of event. 
The body is no longer a vehicle for consciousness, nor is it a privileged site 
of meaning or primary materiality.  On the contrary,  Deleuze's "transcen- 
dental empiricism" (143)  posits a univocality whereby bodies, conscious- 
ness, actions, events, signs, and entities are specific intensities -  each with 
its own modality and difference. They do not need their "difference  from" 
each other in order to be (conceptual difference); in their specific singular- 
ity beings are positively different (203).  Deleuze's univocal conception of 
being is also dynamic. Meaning and concepts of consciousness are events 
within  a general field of  intensities,11 and no  particular event-neither 
mind nor body -  can be posited as the origin or meaning of any other. On 
this account, difference is not  a question of negation.  Sexual difference 
would be one difference among others, but as positive difference it would 
be due to the specific intensity of bodies and not an originary repression. 
To think a "body without organs" is to refuse any single signifier, such as 
the phallus, that would  enable an organization or interpretation of  the 
body. The ethics of sexual difference would  be part of an entire field of 
problems  of  difference. Matter, or  the  body, would  not  be  thought's 
"other"  if thinking were seen as a desiring production, a comportment, an 
activity, or an ethos. The body is not essentially anterior or other. And it 
follows from this that a theory of sexual difference that relies on constitu- 
tive negation may be best overcome not  by turning to  the body or at- 
tacking representation but by questioning the primacy of the representa- 
tion/materiality dichotomy. For it is this dichotomy that organizes many 
theories of sexual difference and leads to the uncritical celebration of the 
body as an inherently liberatory site. 
The maneuvers that we have identified in many feminist accounts of 
anorexia adopt a sense of representation as both alien and causal that de- 
pends on  defining meaning as an act of  consciousness in relation to  a 
world. If there is a primary  mode of difference (between consciousness and 
world) then all the consequences of theories of constitutive negation fol- 
low: the mind is other than body; meaning is other than matter; female 
materiality is other than determination. However, if there is not a single 
11  "There are images, things are themselves images, because images aren't in our brain. 
The brain's  just one image among others. Images are constantly acting and reacting on each 
other, producing and consuming. There's no  difference at all between images,  things, and 
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organizing (negating) difference but a multiplicity of differences, then any 
theory of constitutive negation, and accordingly, any single or privileged 
exteriority would no longer be valid. Sexual difference would occur in a 
field of coterminous differences. In this regard feminism may well have to 
forgo any sense of itself as the fundamental ethical horizon, the primary 
site for the crisis of the Western subject, or the redemptive locus for the 
end of metaphysics. Sexual difference would not be the question of our 
epoch (contra Irigaray)  but would be one of many possible questions.'2 
The body, thought as a body,  and not a body image or internal represen- 
tation, would be a positive event alongside other positive events. It would 
not be the effect of some specular  process, nor would its actions be seen as 
so many signs or negations of a complex interiority.  Deleuze and Guattari's 
critique of psychoanalysis sees the Oedipal subject as one possible staging 
of desire among others. Against the Oedipal story that sees mind as a the- 
ater to  be viewed  and represented, Deleuze  suggests a new  "image of 
thought" (1994,  131)  that would aim to think "thought without an im- 
age" (276).  In Anti-Oedipus (1984)  and A Thousand  Plateaus (1987)  de- 
sire, released  from the organizing hermeneutics of traditional  psychoanaly- 
sis, is capable of infinite connections and variations. As a positive event, 
rather  than a negated origin, desire presents an active multiplicity. Human 
action, accordingly, is not a sign to  be interpreted that would  reveal an 
originary lack. On the contrary, desire works by connections and events 
that generate further events and connections. Action is productive rather 
than representational. Accordingly, one  should ask what an action does 
rather  than what it means (Foucault 1984, xi-xiv). The question that orga- 
nizes  many feminist ethical debates--Is  a practice repressive or libera- 
tory?  -  relies on the possibility of a free consciousness that could precede, 
and be revealed beneath, its representations.  If, however, signs and actions 
are seen as positive, then the ethical value of an act is determined by evalu- 
ating its force within  a network of other acts and practices, and not in 
reference to a putative origin. 
12 The primacy of the question of sexual difference is echoed approvingly by Braidotti. 
Braidotti's early criticism of poststructuralism directed itself against the appropriation and 
liquidation of  the  notion  of  "woman" in  a general movement  of  antisubjectivism. It  is 
Braidotti's criticism of Deleuze -that  sexual difference becomes part of difference in gen- 
eral-that  we see as an ethically enabling direction in Deleuze's work (Braidotti 1994,  146, 
117). For Braidotti's  attempt to assert  sexual difference as ontological difference, the founding 
difference of the subject, depends on the privileged exclusion of maternal corporeality. We 
agree with Braidotti's early interpretation of Deleuze: that sexual difference is appropriated 
into a general field of "becoming" (1991);  but we disagree that this is a lamentable outcome 
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The body inAnti-Oedipus  andA Thousand  Plateaus  is, therefore, not the 
sign of  a prior meaning nor an interiorization produced through lack. 
Rather, the body is productive not because it "expresses"  an interior depth 
but because it connects  (Deleuze and Guattari 1984).  And these connec- 
tions  are not  seen  as relations produced by  an overarching system of 
differences (in which case the singular body would always be the effect of 
the totality). The connections made among bodies are not determined in 
advance but are the result of the play of singularities (60). 
Several consequences follow  from Deleuze and Guattari's  positing of 
the body's positivity. To begin with, actions should not be referred  to some 
unconscious or interior meaning; "desire"  should not be seen as some hid- 
den bearer  of truth or as some final interpretive  horizon (1984,  30). Femi- 
nist theorists might dispense, then, with the attempt to offer some general 
etiological account of certain body practices, such as anorexia. Rather than 
being the negation of some hidden meaning, they might be seen as produc- 
tive, as forms of self-formation. This is not to valorize anorexia as some 
privileged or authentic form of resistant behavior. On the contrary, the 
point would be to do away with notions of ownness, authenticity, auton- 
omy, and the rhetoric of alienation. Anorexia would be one form of self- 
formation among others, and--as  a series of interconnected practices  - 
would need to be considered in terms of what it creates or invents. Rather 
than being the effect of specular relations, anorexia, modes of consump- 
tion, and the comportment of one's body could be seen as forms of inven- 
tion. The very "deviancy"  of the anorexic body would represent a certain 
"failure"  or "blockage"  of the Cartesian  concept (Deleuze 1994, 220). For 
such a body would be precisely where the classical  and regulatory "image 
of thought" as an ordered "theater"  would break down. 
In this quite specific sense, certain practices that have been interpreted 
as signs of some general representational  pathology might be more usefully 
refigured as forms of critique; that is to say, these "deviant,"  "abnormal," 
or "pathological" forms of  bodily comportment might effect a positive 
difference or create a distance from certain regular or normalized ways of 
being. An anorexic's self-production might be better seen less as a failed 
rebellion or negation of an unquestioned ideal body than as the production 
of a "being otherwise." This would not, then, imply a valorization of an- 
orexia or deviancy as a new norm; on the contrary,  the positive effects of 
different practices would lie in the shattering of any general or totalizing 
account of what constitutes a self or thought. This idea of a positive multi- 
plicity (Deleuze  and Guattari 1984,  60)  would  be critical (in a Kantian 
sense) in its recognition that different practices cannot ethically be deter- 
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The antirepresentationalism  of Deleuze may also be questioned in this 
regard. If, as we have argued, the practice  of anorexia and its disruption of 
normalized body practices can be seen as creative, it is because anorexia 
can be examined as a specific mode of being. The ascription of creativity, 
positivity, or activity to  different bodily practices avoids the positing of 
any primary  explanandum (such as representation) of which these practices 
would be effects. If the attribution of a creative positivity to anorexia im- 
plies a valorization of the practice  as an aesthetic comportment, it may well 
be due to antirepresentationalism's  opposition between the rigidity of the 
concept versus the fluidity of poesis. In this sense Deleuze's critique of 
representation implies a privileged difference. Deleuze not only celebrates 
certain writers whose work is seen as inherently disruptive of representa- 
tional thought (such as Kafka,  Joyce, Beckett, Woolf), he also posits poetry 
as an Idea that typifies the dynamic power of language: "Repetition is the 
power of language, and far from being explicable in negative fashion by 
some default on the part of nominal concepts, it implies an always  excessive 
Idea of poetry" (1994,  291).  The idea that art or literature provides an 
exemplary ethical liberation accepts representation's  own definition of the 
concept.13  If concepts are ideal disembodied negations of the fluidity of 
sensibility and experience, then it makes sense to seek liberation in a do- 
main such as poesis that defines itself against the reification of the rational 
concept. But, as Deleuze and Guattari's  own work has argued, concepts 
are already  creative acts (1994).  The aesthetic, while it may foreground its 
active constitution, is also thoroughly located within forms of determina- 
tion and regularity.  The aesthetic is not pure active becoming. A concept 
is never absolutely ideal. To link the ethical as self-constituting and affir- 
mative comportment with the aesthetic in general is, then, to valorize a 
particular  exteriority (art as the general other) and a particular  difference 
(representation vs. the affirmative).  We would agree, then, with Dorothea 
Olkowski's careful reading of Deleuze that shows the clear link between 
the ethical and the aesthetic in Deleuze's Nietzscheanism (Olkowski 1995, 
28). But we would suggest that this link ought to be questioned. 
Clearly,  certain  forms ofantinormalizing practices  that are  creative (such 
as anorexia) remain as problems. Only a celebration of the aesthetic as nec- 
essarily  ethical or transgressive  would make the creative character  of bodily 
practices valuable as such. To argue that the problem of anorexia is an- 
swered by seeing the body as active force is to repeat the same foreclosure 
13 The opposition between representation  and art is made clear  in Difference  andRepetition: 
"The work of art leaves the domain of representation in order to become 'experience' tran- 
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that lies in seeing the body as a repressed effect. If the body is a site of 
production of positive forces and creative differences then this opens  a 
question of the body's ethics. How  we evaluate these modes of creating 
difference cannot be resolved by appealing to a single opposition (ethical/ 
aesthetic  vs. moral/representational).  If we do accept that difference  is posi- 
tive, that there is no privileged exteriority and that ethics is a continual 
task, then the question of sexual difference need no longer be seen as pri- 
mary. We would therefore disagree with Grosz's use of Deleuze to argue 
for the universality of binary sexual difference: "The bifurcation of sexed 
bodies  ...  is, in my opinion,  an irreducible cultural universal" (1994b, 
160). The analysis  of particular  problems, such as anorexia, beneath a gen- 
eral rubric  of sexual difference  might be opened up in two directions. First, 
such specific ethical problems ought not to be read as synecdoches for fe- 
male subjectivity in general. The first part of our article has shown the 
debilitating consequences of arguments that pathologize femininity and 
that explain pathologies by referring  to a general malaise of sexual differ- 
ence. Second, practices like anorexia might be best analyzed according to 
the power relations within which they occur: not as further examples of 
representational  violence but according to the practices  of cure, definition, 
regulation, and contestation that surround them. 
Instead of recruiting anorexia as an example of women's alienation in 
general, it is perhaps more productive to examine the specific archaeology 
of the discourse of anorexia nervosa in order to ask what prevailing theo- 
ries of anorexia do and how they intersect with (and also produce) prac- 
tices of "anorexic behaviour."  Ludwig Binswanger's  famous "The Case of 
Ellen West" (1958)  demonstrates the need for an engagement with "an- 
orexia"  that remains alert to the specific location of bodily practices. 
A contemporary of Freud's, Binswanger developed a form of Heideg- 
gerean psychiatry  that influenced such luminaries as R. D. Laing and Fou- 
cault. If Freud's  "Dora"  has emerged as central  to the representation  of the 
sexual politics  of  hysteria, we  would  argue that  Binswanger's "Ellen" 
should be acknowledged as a formative investigation into the sexual poli- 
tics of eating disorders.  In brief, Binswanger's  case describes  the life history, 
self-starvation, and eventual suicide of a Jewish woman. Drawing on the 
work of Gaston Bachelard, Binswanger proposes an anthropology of the 
imaginary in which the elements of  air, earth, water, and fire compose 
the materiality  of "Ellen's"  imaginary.  "Ellen's"  fear of being fat is seen to 
stem from a desire to escape imprisonment in the "tomb-world" (earth) of 
her body, while her desire to be thin is an attempt to ascend to the "ethereal 
world" (air) of the intellect. As later interpreted  by Bordo (1992),  "Ellen's" 
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tric disembodiment;  her self-starvation is  a self-destructive attempt to 
transform  herself into an image of pure thought. For Bordo this is a "typi- 
cal fantasy,"  articulated  from Plato to Descartes. 
However, this reading elides the particular  discursive  formation of Bins- 
wanger's analysis in which the "ethereal"  and "tomb" worlds also signify 
particular  racial  types. For Binswanger, the "ethereal"  signifies the "higher, 
blond Aryan type" while the "tomb-world" signifies a "fat bourgeois Jew- 
ish type."  Why this fact has been silenced in the many readings of the case 
history is, we would  argue, a question of some import. Binswanger's fa- 
mous case history was originally published in SchweizerArchivfurNeurolo- 
gie und Psychiatrie  in  1944-45  and contains numerous references to the 
superiority of the Aryan body. Binswanger concludes that for "Ellen;"  "be- 
ing thin was equated with a higher intellectual type and being fat with a 
bourgeois Jewish type" (1958,  260).  He describes a student lover as "the 
blond beloved who is part of the ethereal world" and as the "blond, soft" 
representative  of the "higher, spiritual and Aryan type" (290-91). 
In effect, according to Binswanger's aestheticization of the tomb  and 
ethereal worlds, "Ellen" is seen as entombed in a Jewish body. Her self- 
starvation, suggests Binswanger, is a futile attempt to become a particular 
higher physical and Aryan type. If Binswanger's case history is, then, not 
just a repetition of a general phallocentric malaise but a quite specific (Na- 
zist) articulation of particular  body types and relations, a further problem 
with  the subsequent commentaries on the case emerges. In the context 
of Binswanger's  rhetoric of Nazism, Foucault's engagement with the case 
history is worthy of reexamination. Published as an introduction to Bins- 
wanger's  "Dream and Existence" (1984-85),  Foucault's  "Dream, Imagina- 
tion  and Existence" (1984-85)  demonstrates Binswanger's influence on 
the early Foucault and the ways in which any general ontology of the body 
occludes  the  specific politics  of  bodily  descriptions and practices. Ac- 
cording to James  Miller, Foucault would refer  "with warm sympathy to the 
work of the great Heideggerean psychiatrist  Ludwig Binswanger" (Miller 
1993, 50). Miller also argues that Foucault was fascinated by "the psychia- 
trist's most  famous clinical paper" (73-74).  For Foucault, Binswanger's 
work  "outflanks the problem of  ontology  and anthropology  by going 
straight to  concrete existence, to its development and its historical con- 
tent" (Miller 1993,  32).  But the historical content of Binswanger's case 
history is never addressed by Foucault; at no point does he engage with 
the figuration of Aryan and Jewish bodies in the "case."  Referring to "El- 
len's"  Jewish family as "crudely  materialistic"  (Miller 1993, 62), his use of 
the case history within  a general theory of  existence demonstrates, yet 
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bodies are subsumed -  even by Foucault-  beneath a theory of the subject. 
More recently, Chernin's use of the case history argues that "Ellen's" 
self-starvation  is a protofeminist rebellion against the cultural constraints 
of her Jewish family: "In the family of Ellen West we find a mother and 
father who bear the typical problems and dilemmas of their culture. And 
we  can imagine that their passionate little daughter will be impelled to 
protest against the feminine role these people expect her to  fill" (1989, 
167).  The use of  this particular case history demonstrates some  of  the 
problems associated with ahistorical  readings of the anorexic body as well 
as the need for a more direct intervention into the discursive production 
of this body. 
A cursory  glance at the InternationalJournal  ofEating  Disorders  illustrates 
that the "anorexic"  is subject to electric shock treatment and lobotomies 
and also functions as a laboratory body for a host of psychotropic drugs 
(see, e.g., Hsu, Crisp, and Callender 1992; and Ferguson 1993).  Perhaps 
it is not enough simply to recruit the "anorexic"  as an example ofwomen's 
castrated  body image; rather,  it is necessary  to intervene in the biomedical 
construction of this discourse and challenge its ethics. This would entail 
seeing the various "cures"  and "theories"  of"anorexia nervosa"  as positive 
practices existing alongside the practices of "anorexia"  itself. The body of 
the anorexic  would be a site of contestation in which the connections, per- 
formances, and creations made by the patient's body are taken over and 
refigured through biomedical discursive practices. This is not to suggest 
that the "anorexic"  is somehow authentically  disempowered and hence in- 
nocent. An ethics of this encounter would  consider the body of the an- 
orexic as one productive event among others in a network of relations, not 
as the stage or screen on which some predetermined  cultural  neurosis plays 
itself out yet one more time. 
A recognition of  anorexic practices as involuted in a process of  self- 
creation would also entail a consideration of the specific grammar  of those 
practices.  By this we mean an attention to the practices  of calorie counting, 
of weighing  and measuring the body, and of various dietetic regimens. 
These practices  or connections form the event of the anorexic as such. But 
the grammar of these practices or the field within which they are located 
cannot be contained within an anorexic's  "internal"  pathology. Anorexia, 
then, is a series of practices and comportments; there are no  anorexics, 
only activities of dietetics, measuring, regulation, and calculation. Indeed, 
the importance of measuring the most minute transformations  of the body 
brought about by these practices might indicate that they are involuted in 
a numerical grammar  of the flesh -  a grammar  that cannot be isolated and 
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very numerical self-concern that may be the enabling and productive prac- 
tice of a certain form of contemporary self-production. The "deviancy"  of 
anorexic  production through practices  of metabolism, weighing, counting, 
and mathematization would be a discursive event that occurs within a gen- 
eral  discursive  network concerned with analysis,  regulation, and normaliza- 
tion. The anorexic body could be seen as an intensity occurring within a 
positive field of production. This field would not be an isolated object for 
analysis (the anorexic) but an event connected to other events (this prac- 
tice, with  this effect, with  this practice, with  this connection,  with  this 
body, with this sign, etc.). 
Accordingly, a Deleuzean model of  "anorexia"  might approach these 
practices (such as calorie counting, weighing, measuring) as articulations 
of a machinic assemblage, as a series of intensities, flows, and speeds.14 To 
see dietetic regimen as a form of positive self-production might enable a 
thinking of the body in terms of the connections it makes, the intensities 
of its actions, and the dynamism of its practices. Given the metaphoric 
presence of the thermodynamic model within Deleuzean theory and the 
intimate connections between the discourse of thermodynamics and me- 
tabolism, it might be that such a reading is especially applicable  to dietetic 
regimens and their practices, for there are significant correspondences be- 
tween these models and the practices of calorie counting and measuring 
the metabolism of the body. However, such practices are not just specific 
to contemporary articulations  of anorexia but are part of a wider measure- 
ment of the body via dietetic regimens in general. An archaeology of this 
contemporary grammar might "begin" with the discourse of thermody- 
namics (flows, intensities, equilibrium, atrophy) and its connection to me- 
tabolism. To do such an archaeology would not be to discover finally,  once 
and for all, the cause of anorexia (or any other human comportment). If 
it is the case that the "normalized"  contemporary body is organized ac- 
cording to a discourse of metabolics, energy, and measurable force, then 
the anorexic body might operate as a critical  short-circuiting  of contempo- 
rary practices of self-monitoring through quantification. Furthermore, by 
advocating that contemporary theory rethink life in terms of thermody- 
namics, Deleuze's work does more than react against dominant representa- 
tional forces; it takes hold of those forces and makes the images of ma- 
chine, intensity, system, and connection operate differently.  The model of 
thermodynamics likens the self neither to a language (where there is some 
14 In Dialogues, Deleuze refers to anorexia as a phenomenon  that has been subjected to 
misinterpretation precisely to the degree that it has been organized according to a theory of 
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overall systemic determination) nor to a theater (where there is some inner 
performance of a well-rehearsed  meaning). As a machinic assemblage, the 
self is nothing other than the performances  it effects or the connections it 
makes. Such connections may possess a regularity,  but regularity  is not the 
effect of some hidden or pregiven law. An ethics of this machinic assem- 
blage would not look within the mind of a subject, nor see its body as a 
sign. Like all other practices, this ethics would be a positive practice with 
its own positive effects. Its intervention would  be a positive practice set 
alongside, or connecting with, the practice of the encountered body. To 
see difference as multiple and positive is to forgo the possibility of deciding 
ethical questions in advance, according to a rubric of some general differ- 
ence or negation. Such a recognition implies a continual renegotiation of 
ethical boundaries and limits. 
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